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IN T'HE SUPREivlE COURT 
OF T'HE ST.1A_TE OF UTAH 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COl\lP ANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
No. 
10710 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is a proceeding to review a determination of 
the Utah State Tax Commission which held that a 
deficiency use tax in the amount of $888.42 was prop-
erly assessed against the taxpayer on the use of fuel 
oil furnished for commercial consumption within the 
llleaning of Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 
JU,53, as amended. 
1 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH STATJ. 
TAX COMMISSION 
A formal hearing on this matter was held befo:: 
all members of the Utah State Tax Commission 1:, 
April 27, 1966 and on July 14, 1966 the Commissio: 
entered its Decision No. 426, one commissioner disse11 1. 
ing, upholding the deficiency assessment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks to have the majority decisin1 
of the Commission reversed and a judgment enterri: 
holding that fuel oil used in the propulsion of its foi.1 
motives is not used in commercial consumption. 
STATEl\'.lENT O:F FACTS 
The parties to this action have entered into a Stip:, 
lation of Facts (R. 7-23) and these facts are incori1 
rated in and restated in the decision of the Commissi11 
(R. 66-76) and in plaintiff's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
FUEL OIL USED BY THE PLAINT!fl 
IN THE PROPULSION OF LOCOMOTffE: 
IN THE OPERATION OF ITS RAILROAf 
IS FUEL OIL SOLD OR FURNISHED FO~ 
COMMERCIAL CONSUMPTION AND TH[ 
2 
:~ALE OR USE OF SUCH FUEL OIL IS SUB-
.1 ~~CT TO THE UTAH SALES AND USE TAX. 
The applicable statutory provision in this case, 
1;nce our sa lcs and use tax are complementary in opera-
tion, Barrett Investment Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
Li l'.tah 2d 97, 387 P. 2cl 998 (1964); Geneva Steel 
Co. v. Strdc Tu:c Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P. 
~d 208 (Hl4<9); Union Portland Cement Co. v. State 
Tud'ommission, 110 Utah 152, 176 P. 2d 879 (1947), 
j, Sel'tion 59-15-J., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, which provides that: 
From and after the effective date of this act 
there is levied and there shall be collected and 
paid: 
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible 
personal property made within the state of Utah 
equivalent to three percent of the purchase price 
paid or charged, except that where a person 
takes, as a trade-in for part payment of the 
merchandise sold, tangible personal property 
other than money, the tax shall be computed and 
paicl only upon the net difference between the 
selling price of the merchandise sold and the 
amount of the trade-in allowance. The sale of 
l'oal, fuel oil and other fuels shall not be subject 
to the tax except as hereinafter provided. 
(h) A tax equivalent to three per cent of the 
amount paid: 
* * * 
( 2) To any person as defined in this act in-
d11di11g municipal corporations for gas, electri-
l'it)', heat, coal, fuel oil or other fuels sold or 
3 
fi:rnished for domestic ?~ commercial con,i11111 ,. 
tzon. None of the prov1s1ons of this suhmh,, 
shall apply to electric power plant systems 0111;l 
and operated by co-operative or nonprofit to: 
porations engaged in rural electrification. (£1, 
phasis added.) ··· 
We agree with the plaintiff that it is liable fort!. 
tax imposed by the sales and use tax acts only if ti. 
fuel oil is used for commercial consumption. The ten~ 
"commerce" and "commercial" are broad enough:. 
include all business activity. 11 Am. Jur., Commercr 
sec. 3: 
The term "commerce," although employed, 
the Constitution, is nowhere defined therein. ], 
fact, it has hen said that the term is not suscq 
tible of exact and comprehensive definition at! 
that no all-embracing definition has ever bee' 
formulated. The term is one of extensive impor 
and the question as to what constitutes corn 
merce should be approached both affirmatirel1 
and negatively-that is, from the points of 1'it: 
as to what it includes and what it excludes.-~ 
though the term includes traffic, it is mur 
broader. As used in the Constitution, the 11 11r 
is equivalent of the phrase "intercourse for tl 
purpose of trade" and comprises every spec:t 
of commercial intercourse. It includes the P111 
chase, sale, and exchange of commodities. ti 
transportation of persons and property by b, 
and water, and all the instrumentalities by W01' 
such intercourse is carried on. Stated in anotl: 
way, it has been said that the term, as used·· 
the Constitution, includes the fact of intercmir· 
and of traffic and the subject matter of mlr 
course and traffic. The fact of intercourse 
4 
traffic embraces all the means, instruments, and 
plat·t·s l1y which intercourse and traffic are ear-
ricd on,and comprehends the act of carrying 
thew on at these places by and with the;;e means. 
The subject matter of intercourse or traffic may 
be either things, go(Jds, chattels, merchandise 
or persons. 
JJ(l\\C\'er, it is uur view that the legislature adopted 
tlw term in a narrower sense. The legislal:ure used the 
trrn1 "commercial" consumption as opposed to "indus-
trial" cons111nption and intended to exempt from tax-
;i'iirn1 mil>· items which were truly used in industrial 
rnnsumption. 
The plaintiff has contended that it need only sho\v 
that the foel oil was used for some purpose which is 
11ot defined as commercial, whatever that purpose may 
be aud which it has not defined. 'Ve contend, however, 
that the taxpayer must show not only that its use was 
11ot rnmmereial, hut that it must show that the use was 
one of industrial consumption. 
In tlie Joint Committee Report pertaining to Sec. 
1i](j of the Federal Revenue Act of 193:2 (an act closely 
related to oms), it was stated: 
The House recedes with an amendment sub-
stituting a tax of three per cent of the price paid 
for electrical ener.r1,1; and far domestic or com-
mcrt·i11! 11sc (as distinyuislied fro111 industrial 
11sc ! to be paid b>' the purchaser and collected 
ll\· t lw Yenclor wirli admi11istrati.-c proYisions 
a11d au exemption in the case of electrical energy 
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sold to the United States or any state or ten 
tory or political subdivision thereof, or the Di: 
trict of Columbia. (Emphasis added.) 
This statement does not permit an interpretutioJ, 
which says that a taxpayer must only show that 111, 
use was not commercial. It was intended that two broati 
categories of use be established within the busine" 
community and that a taxpayer must fit within one 
of them. A taxpayer's use must be either commerci:: 
or industrial and if his activity is essentially commerr·;i 
he is subject to the tax imposed by the statute. 
The plaintiff in its brief has set forth several state 
ments made by members of the United States Hou1t 
of Representatives at the time the statute was bemi 
considered. One of the questions asked and the resp0111· 
given would seem to indicate that electric railways werr 
not to be held subject to the tax imposed by the statult 
It is submitted, however, that this exchange betww 
members of the House in the course of debate is nn'. 
conclusive of the final effect of the bill, particularl1 
where it is in conflict with the official documents per· 
taining to the consideration of the bill and contrary 11 
the statute. 
In St. Louis Refrigeration and Cold Storage ('r 
v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 476, (Ct. CL 1942),tk 
taxpayer used electrical energy in the operation of' 
refrigerated warehouses in the St. Louis area. The t:n 
payer there sought to avoid imposition of the tax'' 
the electrical energy used in the operation of its bni. 
6 
111,s H, too, refered to statements which had been made 
dtirnig the course of debate on Sec. 616. The Court 
of Claims rejected the taxpayer's contention, stating: 
The discussions in the Congress covered a wide 
range. Many individual statements were made. 
These are quoted in extenso by both parties with 
conflicting interpretations. However, the Con-
ference Report which \Vas made by the Joint 
Conference Committee representing both the 
Senate and House, and •which was the last corn-
mittcc e.1:plmwtio11 before final vote ttas taken, 
contained the following explanation of the tax-
ing provision which was made here: 
(See .T oint Committee statement quoted above.) 
* * * 
If any ambiguity existed and any explana-
tions were needed a part from the language of 
the statute, this final Joint Conference Com-
mittee Report makes it clear that it was the in-
tention that the term "commercial" should have 
a meaning broader than the restricted sense 
plaintiff would have us apply. It explains that 
the ta.r applies to commercial as distinguished 
from industrial use. It then exempts only elec-
trical energ~' sold to the government, national 
or state, or a political subdivision thereof. 
The use of the two terms bv wav of contrast 
. . . would 5eem to preclude. the· intermediate 
classification ,vhich plaintiff attempts to read 
into the statute. 
It hard]~, seems necessary to go behind the 
clear wording of the statute. Certainly it is un-
llecessar)' to go behind the Joint Conference 
Report into the maze of discussion and interpre-
7 
tation by individual members of the Congre'· 
when the statute itself, which is the final pr~dui 
of their labors, is couched in simple languag
1
. 
clearly expressed. 
The court then held that the taxpayer's use i1: 
electrical energy constituted commercial consumpliii! 
and that it was subject to the tax imposed by the statul• 
In Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. United Sfa!i, 
336 U.S. 176, 69 Sup. Ct. 492, 93 L. Ed. 591 (mg
1 
the taxpayer supplied electrical energy to a numoer 
of dairy plants and sought to avoid the burden 11 111 
responsibility of collecting the electrical energy tax 1111 
the ground that the busines activity of the dairy plant, 
was not commercial. There, also, the court refused !1 
recognize any twilight zone between industrial and corn 
mercial, stating: 
Although the language of the section does no' 
include the word "industrial" it is clear fro[ 
the legislative history that "commercial" "a' 
used in contradistinction to "industrial." Whu1 
electricitv sold for commercial consumption ;, 
taxed, th.at sold for industrial consumption is no1• 
The court then went on to state: 
The legislative history indicates that the tellh 
"commercial" was meant to apply to the naturr 
of the business in which the energy is consum11 
and not to the specific purpose to which em 
measurable unit of electricity is devoted. 
This court, too, has considered these classificati(l\ 
and it has not recognized an area which is neither curE 
8 
111crcial nor industrial. In Uniun Portland Cement Co. 
,. Slr1/c 'L'fl,r Commission, llO Utah 135, 170 P. 2d 
lilt modified on rehearing llO Utah 152, 176 P. 2d 
87Y ( 194<7), the court in considering the use of coal 
fiy the taxpayer found that it was called upon to deter-
mine whether the use was one of commercial consump-
tion or industrial consumption. These terms, for the 
~11rpose of the statute, are used in contra-distinction 
:llld there is no in-between area which may or may not 
be .,ubjeet to taxation. 
In Yle\\' of these decisions and the Joint Conference 
Committee Report, it is contended that the Utah statute 
1houl1l also be interpreted as aJlowing only two classi-
fications - commercial and industrial - and that the 
plaintiff must show that its business activity is industrial 
in nature in order to be relieved of the sales and use 
tax imposed upon the consumption of fuel oil. 
There is no simple or general definition of what 
business activity is commercial and what is industrial; 
and, iu the f'Visconsin Electric Power Co. case, supra, 
the Fnited States Supreme Court refused to set forth 
Mh a definition, stating: 
YV e shall not undertake the difficult and here 
needless task of general definition which differ-
entiates for this statutory clause between indus-
trial and commercial in· other lines of business 
activity. That is a problem primarily for the 
administrators of the section with knowledge of 
the specific and varying facts. 
~or ha:, this court set forth a general definition of 
9 
industrial consumption as opposed to commercial ,
111 
sumption. 
For the purpose of this case and the statute. , 
would appear that industrial consumption contempbt· 
the use of coal, fuel oil or other fuels to process, manu 
facture, fabricate or operate on a product whici1 • 
then sold or disposed of. 
In the instant case foe fuel oil is not so used. ·n 
Laxpaycr is the final consumer and the oil is used: 
achieve the taxpayer's primar>T f nnction, propelli1:~ 
its locomotives over its rail nehvork in the transport 
tion of persons and things. The fuel oil, then, was IF 
used in nor closely related to the process, rnanufact111 
or fabrication of a product which is then sold or dispn1t 
of. 
This consumption is commercial and there is n. 
industrial consumption exempt from the tax as c11 11 
templated by the statute. 
In Chicago B. & ("'-· R. Co. v. Iowa State Ta,d11 
rnission, ____ Iowa ____ , 142 N.,V. 2d 407 (1966). ti 
taxpayer sought a refund of the use tax imposed up 
fuel oil it had purchased outside of the state. 'fl 
Iowa statute provided an exemption from the use t 
for " ... fuel ·which is consumed in creating power 
heat or steam for processing or for generating e!edr 
current." This exemption as so delineated seems clenrl. ' 
to pertain to industrial consumption such as we hai 
discussed above and would provid1~ no exemption f 
commerical consumption, the term used in our stat 111' 
1 
10 
The taxpayer in the Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. case 
·"11giit to come within the exemption by arguing that 
tlic f1wl oil was used in generating electricity which 
11 a~ then useci to operate its diesel electric engines. The 
r·mirt rejected this contention stating: 
\Yhat plaintiff does is not generate electric 
current, but run locomotives. The fuel oil used 
is consumed in operating locomotives. To come 
within the definition of property used in process-
ing, in subsection (b), plaintiff is taking an 
intermediate step in the use of the fuel to run 
the locomotive, not the end result. 
inn then at page 411, the court further observed: 
Om interpretation is simply, when the statute 
is considered as a whole, generating electric cur-
rent is used in a sense conternplating a complete 
action or end result and does not include one who 
consumes fuel to run a locomotive, even though 
as an intermediate step he generates electric 
current. (Emphasis added.) 
The court then went on to hold that the taxpayer was 
iubject tu the Iowa sales and use tax. 
That case is not too unlike the case we have under 
consideration here and the difference in the wording 
uf the statutes does not compel a different result. The 
er Ioll'a statute clearly contemplates an exemption for 
r industrial use while contemplating taxation of com-
r!. iuercial use. even though the statute does not use the 
11 term ''commercial." Our statute, approaching the ques-
tio11 from the other way, declares that all commercial 
,:, r·r'ti.\Ulllption is taxable and by implication indicates 
11 
that industrial consumpL011 ;s Pot taxable, eve11 !]1,11 ,, 
the statute does not use the term "industrial.·' s(, 
this regard the first L.711iou Portland Cement Co. 1 , · 
supra: 
It appears, ther•~fore, from all the pnnisi"i 
of Sec. 80-15-4 taken together that, first, .1:11, 
of coal, etc., were exempt from the salc.1 ia 
except as thereinaher provided. Second, It ;,, 
thereinafter pror:idcd <'rwt coal. etc., user/ 1 
domestic and corn;nercial ('011sumptio11 were m:iu. 
subject to the salcfJ i<u, hence this left indusfri, 
coals, etc .. not su{;}ecl to the sales ta.r. (Empl1> 
sis added). 
In both cases the fuel oil is used to provide tlr 
energy necessary to propel the companies' locomutir 
-the end result or end product ·which the taxpa)·e1 
seeking-and this is commercial consumption ratl:1 
than industrial consumption. 
Finally, some consideration should be giwn tori. 
opinion of this court in Or;d1'n Union Raifr.cay 111 
Depot Co. v. State Tai' Commission, 16 Utah 2d ~i.· 
399 P. 2d 145 ( 1965), (on rehearing). Although ii: 
1 
court was not there concerned \vi th the use of coal' 
fuel oil to propel locomotiYes as in the instant case. I! 
court made an observation which we consider tu! 
quite pertinent here: 
.A. careful c:onsif1era tim~ of the entire snle' t 
statute, Section 5~l- ~ 5-4, l__T.C ... A. Hl53, tend» 
support the Commi_,s;on's conclnsioti. The s:r 
statute which proyides for the tax on coal)'' 
or furnished for "cmnrnercial" comtllllji' 
12 
!\",, 
. 1: 
I 
(I' 
I 
,1,, 
( Scetiou 59-15-4 ( b) ( 2) , by its other subdivi-
soins (b), (d), (e), (f) and (g)) also expressly 
taJ'Cs a wide garnut of other seniices such as 
t rn 11.1·JHJJ"tation, amusements, hotels, motels, caf es 
and laundries, all of which are properly classi-
fied as "cornmercial" and includes with them 
;,common carrier" operations. (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
The plaintiff is unquestionably a common carrier 
<1111! is unquestionably engaged in the business of trans-
purting people and goods. It is the final consumer of 
the fiiel oil. As this court observed in the Ogden Unoin 
ease just quoted, these are commercial type activities 
:mil being commercial the fuel oil used by the plaintiff 
i1 subject to the sales and use tax. 
POINT II 
PRIOR FAILURE TO TAX FUEL OIL 
f'SED IN THE PROPULSION OF LOCOMO-
TffES, BASED ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PRACTICE AND INTERPRETATION, IS NO 
BAR TO \TALID SUBSEQUENT TAXATION 
WHICH IS PROSPECTIVE IN OPERATION . 
The plaintiff in its brief has argued that the Com-
missio11 has never taxed fuel oil used by railroad com-
panies except for one abortive attempt to do so in 1944, 
and that it should not be permitted to do so now. 'V"hile 
11 :1~iderable weight generally is and should be given 
ti. ~111 administrative interpretation, if that interpreta-
·:,,11 i~ 1vro11g and eontrary to the statute then it should 
13 
not be allowed to stand. Nor should an administrati' 
agency be prohibited from adopting a correct interprt 
tation of a statute, prospective in operation, even If 
1
:' 
means rejection of a prior interpretation, where 
11 
experience and the development of the law indiealL 
that the prior interpretation was erroneous. As is stattil 
in Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, p. 327, an nd 
ministrative agency's " ... activities ought not to \1 
frozen, but the agency should have freedom to try ti, 
achieve general legislative objectives by taking int 
account later developments and experience." 
And, in E. C. Olson Co. v. State Tax Commission. 
109 Utah 563, 168 P. 2d 324 (1946), this court he\1! 
that the failure of the Tax Commission to collect a ta.1 
properly collectible for over 12 years was no bar to j\, · 
present collection of the tax. It was there stated: 
I 
The facts of this case merely show that for l 
over 12 vears the Tax Commission has failed t 
1 
discover· that taxes as required by the sales ta .. 
law were not being paid by plaintiff on the qur'· 
tioned sales. The Tax Commission because ui 
said failure to discover the mistake is now prt·
1 
eluded by statute ... from collecting the defi 
ciency except for the past three years, wlncn 
collection the Commission is attempting to mah 
in this case. It will not be serio11 sly contendfi 
that because the Twr Commission has for so mni: 
years omitted to assess and collect the t,a,r on 1;11 
questioned sales it is no•w precludc0 fro~i Pi; 
forming that dnti; and from salvagmg frolll · . t (Ew past omissions whnt it can for the sta e. · 
phasis added.) 
14 
nd 
ul 
IOl1 
111\11 
Likewise, the failure of the Commission-because 
ill uncertainty and doubt or some other reason-to col-
lect tlte sales and use tax on fuel oil consumed by this 
plaintiff aud others similarly situated should not operate 
"' a bar to collection now where it has been properly 
<lPlrnnined that the fuel oil was furnished for commer-
cial consumption. 
The plaintiff devotes a considerable portion of its 
brief to the task of taking issue with Attorney Gen-
er:d's Opinion No. 65-038. It is sufficient to state here 
that the plaintiff's liability for the Utah sales and use 
tax is determined by the statute not the Attorney 
General'5 opinion. If the plaintiff is using fuel oil for 
ta.1 commercial consumption, it is subject to the tax. 
o it, Further, it should be noted that this case is here on 
reYiew not from the determination made in Attorney 
) General's Opinion No. 65-038 but from a determination 
· fori ma1lr by the Utah State Tax Commission in its Decision 
xl i ' 
; b Xo. 246 which, in detail, sets forth the basis for that 
111f,. determination. 
This court need only determine whether the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made by the Com-
,\'hict. nus~ion ,the trier of the facts, are supported by the 
rnnl1 ·d 
;e u' 
prr 1 
den 
:11dc: 
11W 
1111111 
'pt 
nni1· 
I Ei 
en ence and whether the Commission correctly inter-
preted the statute. This court is not called upon to 
determine whether the Attorney General's opinion is 
moneous and should be discarded" since this is not 
lite matter here on review. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
It is contended, then, particularly in view uf ti 
case law as it has developed throughout the countr): 
discussed above, that the plaintiff's business is cui:. 
mercial in nature within the meaning of the Utah sak 
and use tax statutes providing for taxation of flit), 
sold or furnished for domestic or commercial consum1, 
tion. It is urged, then, that the determination of ii 
Utah State Tax Commission be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
HENRY L. ADAMS 
Assistant Attorney Gener::'. 
State Capitol Buiiding / 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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